The mining policy of the Philippines and «resource nationalism» towards nation-building by Chaloping-March, Minerva
 
Journal de la Société des Océanistes 
138-139 | 2014
Les mises en récit de la mine dans le Pacifique










Date of publication: 15 December 2014





Minerva Chaloping-March, « The mining policy of the Philippines and «resource nationalism» towards
nation-building », Journal de la Société des Océanistes [Online], 138-139 | 2014, Online since 15
December 2017, connection on 10 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/jso/7067  ;
DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/jso.7067 
Journal de la société des océanistes est mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative
Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
Journal de la Société des Océanistes, 138-139, année 2014
ABSTRACT
his paper looks at the extent to which the Mining 
Act of 1995 responds to the aspirations of citizen consti-
tuencies such as local governments. he law provides the 
regulatory and institutional framework for the operation 
of large-scale mining in the hope that substantial foreign 
capital is brought into government cofers. he law also 
provides for mechanisms to ensure community consul-
tation, local government empowerment, concern for the 
indigenous communities, and equitable beneits sharing. 
However, the national government – with the country’s 
minerals industry – has focused on foreign investments 
at the expense of equity and beneit allocations for local 
communities. Several local governments have blocked the 
entry of large-scale mining or forbidden open pit mining. 
Such action, including new local legislations, mani-
fests sub-national resource nationalism that is founded 
on locality and ainity to homeland, and confronts the 
national government in matters of resource governance.
Keywords: resource nationalism, Philippines Min-
ing Act, local governments, social imaginaries, 
mining policy 
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article examine l’adéquation de la loi minière de 
1995 aux aspirations de la représentation  citoyenne, 
dont les gouvernements locaux. Cette loi fournit le cadre 
régulateur et institutionnel pour l’accueil de grands 
projets pour inancer le budget de l’État. Elle ofre 
aussi des mécanismes garantissant la consultation des 
communautés, le renforcement des pouvoirs des gouver-
nements locaux, le respect des communautés autochtones 
et un partage équitable des bénéices. Mais le gouverne-
ment national – avec l’industrie minière du pays – s’est 
concentré sur les investissements étrangers aux dépens 
d’une redistribution équitable. Des gouvernements 
locaux ont interdit le démarrage de gros projets miniers 
ou l’extraction à ciel ouvert. Ces actions, incluant la 
promulgation de lois locales, expriment un nationalis-
me des ressources « infranational » ancré dans la localité 
et le lien au territoire et opposé au gouvernement natio-
nal en matière de gouvernance des ressources
Mots-clés : nationalisme des ressources, Philip-
pines, Loi minière, gouvernement local, imag-
inaires sociaux, politique minière
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In current literature, most discussions on re-
source nationalism have focused on its causes 
and manifestations (Clarke and Cummins, 
2012) particularly its impact on industry and 
investment patterns on the producing country 
and the risks on the part of investors (Bremmer 
and Johnston, 2009; Emel, Huber and Makene, 
2011; Ernst and Young, 2013). Resource na-
tionalism is viewed as a cyclical phenomenon 
(Stevens, 2008) and is one in which the global 
and the national landscapes and their relation-
ship with one another are «tested and reined» 
(Ward, 2009). In certain cases, these global-na-
tional landscapes are characterized by long-term 
extractive industry dependency that restricts po-
licy options of the producing country (Kohl and 
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minerals are in situ, mining companies have to 
go to the areas where the resources are found. A 
host country accommodates foreign companies 
to carry out mining within its territory. An inves-
ting company receives rights to extract minerals 
under conditions which are largely deined by 
the political, institutional, socio-economic and 
cultural landscape of the host country. hus a 
mutually interdependent relationship develops: 
the host country relies on the mining company 
for foreign capital while the latter is granted cer-
tain rights in extracting minerals.
Over time, the form and scope of this contrac-
tual relationship undergo changes. he ensuing 
changes have important implications for pur-
suing the interests of each party. It is during this 
instance when resource nationalism not only 
manifests itself but is re-examined by the host 
government. Resource nationalism involves ac-
tions and motivations of a resource-endowed 
country to ensure primacy over the development 
of its mineral resources vis-à-vis the participation 
of foreign investors. It represents the attempts of 
the host country’s assertion of greater control 
over how the mineral resources located within 
state territory are developed in order to maxi-
mize government revenues from production.
During the 1980s through 1990s, resource-en-
dowed countries centred on attracting foreign 
investment by boosting the competitiveness 
of their iscal regimes for mining. his meant 
that their policies established generous terms 
in favour of mining companies. Heeding to 
recommendations of international inancial ins-
titutions such as the World Bank (Haselip and 
Hilson, 2005; wb-ifc, 2003), many developing 
countries revised their mining policies. his 
was a trend that relected in part the stif com-
petition and the apparent exigency to stir and 
promote mining investments (Smith and Naito, 
1998). During the period 1985 to 1995, there 
were over 90 countries that legislated new mi-
ning laws, revised substantially their prevailing 
mining policies, or were formulating new legisla-
tion (Otto, 1997). Policy changes made by deve-
loping countries include simplifying permitting 
procedures to provide lexibility in investment 
agreements. In addition, taxation schemes were 
becoming more comprehensive to both attract 
investors and maximize government revenues 
(unctad Secretariat, 1997). 
However, the situation has changed in the se-
veral years that followed. By 2003, commodity 
prices have soared. Host countries have become 
more concerned about obtaining a bigger cut of 
the mining revenue pie (Gravelle, 2012). he 
rise in commodity prices prompted producing 
countries to raise royalty and taxation in their 
Farthing, 2012). Resource nationalism has been 
investigated as a demonstration of a resource- 
endowed country’s motivation to expand its 
share of resource rent.
What has remained largely unexamined in-
cludes the complex interactions in resource na-
tionalism and the main actors involved other 
than the host country and the foreign investors. 
here is scarce understanding about whether a 
resource nationalist position of a state is shared 
or concurred, or conversely, challenged by its 
citizens. his paper deals with these issues by 
examining the case of the Philippines. he paper 
looks into constituent citizens confronting the 
centralized control of the State over mineral re-
sources and their development and exploitation.
he paper begins with some deinitions of key 
terms such as «resource nationalism» and «sove-
reignty» pertinent to mining. I then proceed to 
look into the economic liberalization policy em-
braced by the Philippine state. his brings the 
discussion to the enactment of a new mining po-
licy in 1995. he passage of this law and the pro-
cess of implementing it have provided a context 
for the collision of several perspectives on «deve-
lopment» and ideas of equity, locality, and sove-
reignty. I present the narratives which form part 
of social imaginaries of the key actors in mining. 
he paper ends by tying together the key points 
I earlier raised towards the conclusion: resource 
nationalism is not plainly an assertive posturing 
of a government pertinent to administering re-
source extraction. Rather, resource nationalism 
is rooted in connectedness to a homeland. Given 
their shared experiences and common visions of 
change in the status quo, key sectors of the Phi-
lippine citizenry forge actions to confront the 
Philippine state.
For this paper, I use some of the ieldwork data 
collected during my PhD research (June – Aug 
2003, July 2004 to May 2005), and interviews du-
ring separate ieldworks in March-April 2010 and 
August 2011. I add some data generated through 
interviews which I carried out for a recent project1 
in December 2013-January 2014. hese are sup-
plemented by information synthesized from archi-
val materials and critical review of published lite-
rature, government documents, and press releases.
Mining and resource nationalism
he continuity of mining as a global industry 
depends on the availability of minerals to ensure 
a stable supply of commodities. However, a rea-
lity in mining as an economic activity is the im-
mobility of mineral resources. Considering that 
1.  he project is on social mapping and analysis of key stakeholders in exploration and mining in Camarines Norte, a 
major mining province in the Philippines.
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afairs of another. Sovereignty is a principle as 
well as a practice (Litin, 1997). It is not an «ei-
ther or» matter. A state must not be regarded 
as either «having» or «not having» sovereignty. 
Rather, as Yasin (2010) clariies, sovereignty is 
a matter of degree. James Rosenau (1995: 195) 
explains that the sovereignty of a state must be 
understood as lying within a continuum rang-
ing from «convenience-of-state» at one end, to 
«states-are obliged-to-go along» at the opposite 
end. his means that depending on situations, 
the state relocates its sovereignty from one point 
to another along the continuum.
In a global economic system, a resource-en-
dowed country becomes open to external eco-
nomic events beyond its control. It inds itself 
inviting foreign investors in order to generate 
adequate capital to be able to fully participate 
in the global market. he strength of the state is 
tested and demonstrated in the ways by which it 
accommodates the demands of the global econ-
omy. It might appear that as the state fulils the 
requirements of regional or transnational bodies, 
its power as a sovereign entity is allocated away. 
However, this is not so. he allocation of power 
«away» from the state is authorized or consented 
and that the consenting entity remains and is 
always the state (Yasin, 2010). Rosenau further 
clariies that under conditions of globalization, 
sovereignty is both saturated by and placed with-
in dynamic, persistently repetitive, turbulent po-
litical processes.
he two elements that are vital to the idea of 
sovereignty are control and authority (Nagan 
and Haddad, 2012: 435). Litin (1997: 169) 
adds a third one which is essentially the most 
critical as far as the Philippines is concerned, i.e., 
legitimacy, which he deines as the «recognized 
right to make rules». he concept of legitimacy 
incorporates a clearly normative component 
and is reinforced by control and autonomy. 
his means that the idea of sovereignty does not 
apply only to a state’s relationship with external 
bodies. Rather, a state’s sovereignty in governing 
resources involves establishing and maintaining 
legitimacy before its citizens. 
In the speciic case of the Philippines, the 1987 
Constitution (Article II Section 2) declares the 
following: 
«he Philippines is a democratic and republican 
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all go-
vernment authority emanates from them.» 
attempt to maximise their income revenues. he 
overall global trend is an increase in the tax bur-
den on mining companies as host governments 
regard mining companies to be making ample 
proits in light of soaring mineral prices.
In the Philippines, the current president Beni-
gno Simeon Aquino III issued on July 2012 
Executive Order 79 (2012), which makes mo-
diications of the Mining Act of 1995 and arti-
culates the mining policy of his administration. 
he issuance of Executive Order 79 is partly due 
to the growing clamour of various stakeholders 
(i.e., local governments, communities and civil 
society groups) for a fair share of the value of ex-
tracted resources. In addition, these stakeholders 
claim that there has been lack of meaningful in-
volvement of communities in decisions and ini-
tiatives afecting them. Resource nationalism, as 
this paper discusses, involves what community 
citizens regard as the core of managing resources 
for the good of communities. his refers to ai-
nity to the place where a resource is found – and 
such sense of attachment exists only among local 
residents. Hence, the idea of «development» that 
appeals to local communities is that which in-
volves their initiatives, systems, and knowledge 
in the utilization of natural resources and subse-
quently beneit them.
Sovereignty and Mineral Resources
A key notion that is closely tied to resource na-
tionalism is «sovereignty». he modern concept 
of this term is traced to the French jurist and 
political philosopher Jean Bodin who made the 
earliest discussion of the theory of sovereignty. 
According to Bodin (1955: 24), sovereignty is 
that «absolute and perpetual power vested in a 
commonwealth». For the purpose of this paper, 
we take the quintessence of the term that is ex-
pressed in Bodin’s deinition – the power of a 
state. Bodin noted that this power: 
«is in the irst place absolute, in that it is wholly free 
from the restraint of law, and is held subject to no 
conditions or limitations» (Merriam, 2001: 7)2
In our present-day world, sovereignty of the 
state is associated mainly with the idea that states 
have the power to run their own afairs, inclu-
ding how mineral resources must be extracted, 
by whom and under what terms.
A sovereign state is an autonomous entity and 
no state has a right to intervene in the internal 
2.  Bodin was not advocating for an absolutist state. It would be clearer to view Bodin’s idea of sovereignty in the con-
text of the political chaos of his time. According to Nagan and Haddad (2012) the public order of Europe and the idea 
of Christian universality were crumbling under the inluence of the Reformation. he end of the Holy Roman Empire 
marked the weakening of Christian Universalism in Europe and in turn a legacy of religious wars. hese wars seemed 
unending and generated social disorder and anarchy.
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aimed to rejuvenate the country’s economy. 
Known as the «Philippines 2000», Ramos envi-
sioned the Philippines to join the newly indus-
trializing countries by the year 2000. he pro-
gram components are outlined in the Philippine 
Medium-Term Development Plan for the years 
1993-1998. It emphasized the need to achieve 
global competitiveness for the Philippines (Ra-
mos, 1993). he Plan called for a continuation 
of the policy of liberalization, deregulation, and 
globalization (Jurado, 2003) that was started by 
Corazon Aquino, Ramos’s predecessor. 
During her term, Aquino began liberalizing 
the economy that involved privatization of more 
than 250 government-owned and controlled 
corporations (Gonzalez III, 2001). Aquino is-
sued Executive Order 279 in July 1987 to foster 
investment in the mining industry. his law gave 
authority to a cabinet-level oicer, the Secretary 
of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (denr), to «enter into, for and in be-
half of the Government», business transactions 
such as joint venture or production-sharing 
agreements that involve the exploration, deve-
lopment, and utilization of mineral resources 
«with any Filipino citizen, or corporation or 
association at least sixty percentum of whose 
capital is owned by Filipino citizens» (Executive 
Order 279, 1987, Section 1). his authority 
which was formerly a prerogative reserved only 
for the President of the Philippines was intended 
to ease, as it did, the entry of many foreign mi-
ning companies. 
Succeeding Aquino as President, Ramos ope-
ned more extensively the doors to foreign inves-
tors for all industries: deregulating, liberalizing 
and privatizing almost all government owned 
corporations. he Philippines was one of many 
developing countries to adopt neo-liberal econo-
mic policies to attract more mining investments.
he Mining Act of 1995
Under President Ramos, Republic Act 7942, 
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, 
was approved. As hoped for by the national go-
vernment, the passage of this law led to the entry 
of foreign investors. Scarcely a few months after 
the law was passed, more than 50 applications for 
inancial technical assistance agreements (ftaas) 
were already iled at the Mines and Geosciences 
Bureau (mgb). In 1996, 20 of the world’s largest 
mining companies established oices in the Phi-
lippines. hey iled applications for various mi-
ning tenements. Subsequently, the applications 
led to the approval of several exploration projects 
(Cabalda, Banaag, Tidalgo, and Garces, 2002) 
and brought euphoria within the Chamber of 
Mines of the Philippines (comp), the mgb and 
the national government.
he Philippine national government, in coopera-
tion with the country’s mining industry – mainly 
through the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines 
(comp) – has been feverishly promoting mining as 
the engine of economic growth. However such ac-
tion has caused factions among other key stakehol-
ders in mining. As an economic activity and as an 
industry, mining has prompted debates involving 
views from government agencies, mining execu-
tives, academicians, economists, local government 
oicials as well as representatives of the religious 
sector, indigenous organizations, and environ-
ment and conservation groups. here are several 
reasons why mining remains a polemical subject 
matter in the Philippines:
a) an earnest goal, or desperate objective, within the 
national government to address iscal di culties,
b) an eager anticipation of business and industry 
groups to seize opportunities for foreign invest-
ment in mining,
c) a genuine concern of many citizens about 
the long-term adverse social and environmental 
consequences associated with mining activities, 
including the cultural and economic wellbeing 
of communities especially ater a mine operation 
has long shut down,
d) a lingering distrust of many citizens in the 
ability and sincerity of the national government 
and the minerals industry to address the con-
cerns of communities who are adversely afected 
by mining operations, and
e) a continuing doubt and skepticism among or-
ganized citizen groups that exploitation of min-
erals by foreign companies is the right path to 
national development.
In other words, the actions of the Philippine na-
tional government, which include granting foreign 
investors nearly monopolistic rights over mineral 
resources and entitling them enormous tax incen-
tives, is not fully supported by several sectors of the 
Philippine citizenry. he national government’s 
granting priority rights to those who have the 
foreign capital, and undermining the aspirations 
of local citizens, negates nationalism. he over-
centrality of control by the national government 
in directing the exploitation, development and 
utilization of mineral resources repudiates local 
initiatives and mechanisms in addressing resource 
and environment concerns. In efect, enormous 
setbacks have dragged the full implementation 
of the Mining Act. Until the present, the law has 
continued to saunter a thorny path.
Economic Liberalization: Launching Phase and 
Full Realization
In the early 1990s, the 12th President of the 
Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, pursued his admi-
nistration’s grand industrialization scheme that 
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«I am thinking, rather, of the ways in which people 
imagine their social existence, how they it together 
with others, how things go on between them and 
their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, 
and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations.» (2004: 23) 
In other words, a social imaginary incorporates 
normative ideas, i.e., how matters ought to be 
based on how processes or systems have been 
carrying on. hus, a social imaginary blends 
both factual and normative dimensions of social 
existence. It plays an important role in unders-
tanding, orchestrating, and promoting develop-
ment in a society. Key sectors of the Filipino 
population generally share narratives pertinent 
to what they consider as «development». Actions 
pertinent to realize desired changes in the sta-
tus quo, and other initiatives which are directed 
at achieving betterment of economic, environ-
mental and social conditions all embody a social 
imaginary, and are expressed in narratives of key 
players in mining, about which I now turn to.
National Government
he 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987, Article 
12 Section 2) declares that the Philippine State owns 
«all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, 
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of 
potential energy, isheries, forests or timber, wildlife, 
lora and fauna, and other natural resources.» 
In addition, 
«the exploration, development, and utilization of 
natural resources shall be under the full control and 
supervision of the State.» 
his is a critical premise and a clear fact that is well-
accepted by all sections of the Filipino population.
he narrative of key government oicials per-
tinent to economic development is encapsulated 
in key phrases enunciated by former President 
Ramos in his state of the nation address in 1993. 
He presented his program that was hailed as the 
«Philippines 2000». Ramos stressed that the Phi-
lippines has to engage in «opening the economy» 
in order to be at par with competing countries, 
«dismantle the structure of protectionism and 
controls», and alleviate poverty which is the «cen-
tral thrust of all our programs» (1993, emphasis 
supplied). hese ideas have been re-echoed in 
the Mining Act of 1995 and reiterated in a law 
issued by Ramos’s successor Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. Executive Order 2703 (2004, emphasis 
supplied) states:
Under the Mining Act, there are three types 
of permits: an exploration permit, a mineral 
agreement, and a inancial technical assistance 
agreement (ftaa). A detailed discussion of each 
is not permissible in this paper due to limited 
space. Among the three, the ftaa has been the 
most controversial. It is an agreement between 
a contractor and the Government of the Phi-
lippines and allows 100% foreign ownership. It 
grants the contractor rights for large-scale explo-
ration, as well as development and utilization of 
minerals. An ftaa has a term of 25 years, and ex-
tendable for another 25 years. It requires a mini-
mum committed investment of US$ 50 million 
for infrastructure and mine development. he 
terms and conditions of the contract, including 
the government share, are negotiated. he Mi-
ning Act also grants mining companies to occupy 
an area of 81,000 hectares where the company 
enjoys timber rights, water rights and easement 
rights. he incentives granted to foreign mining 
companies include tax holidays and 100% repa-
triation of their capital and proit.
he avenue given to foreigners to fully own and 
control mining operations in the Philippines has 
become an extremely contentious issue. he situa-
tion has triggered what Rosenau describes as ‘tur-
bulent processes’ that have deined the ebb and 
low of the Mining Act’s implementation.
Social Imaginaries
In this paper, I use the term social imaginary 
as elucidated by the philosopher Charles Taylor. 
He observes that community populations come 
together to envision their lives in particular and 
often instinctively shared ways. Taylor refers to 
these as «social imaginaries». Taylor explains:
«Our social imaginary at any given time is complex. 
It incorporates a sense of the normal expectations we 
have of each other, the kind of common understan-
ding that enables us to carry out the collective prac-
tices that make up our social life. his incorporates 
some sense of how we all it together in carrying out 
the common practice. Such understanding is both 
factual and normative; that is, we have a sense of how 
things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea 
of how they ought to go, of what missteps would 
invalidate the practice.» (2004: 24) 
Taylor asserts that a social imaginary involves 
«something much broader and deeper than the 
intellectual schemes people may entertain when 
they think about social reality in a disengaged 
mode». Taylor describes: 
3.  National Policy Agenda on Revitalizing Mining in the Philippines issued on 16 January 2004.
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presentatives of foreign mining companies. he 
purpose was to promote the mineral prospects of 
the Philippines particularly the 24 priority mi-
ning projects5. As earnestly hoped for by comp, 
the conference resulted in the signing of many 
Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs) and let-
ters of intent between foreign mining companies 
and local mining partners (Disini, 2006).
Local Governments
he welcoming stance of the national govern-
ment towards mining projects and the enthu-
siasm of the comp in promoting the Philippines 
as a haven for mining investments have not been 
shared fully by a few local governments. Across 
the Philippines there have been varying degrees 
of local government inhospitality towards po-
tential mining projects within their speciic 
political-geographic jurisdictions. Republic Act 
7160, otherwise known as the Local Govern-
ment Code of the Philippines (1991) devolved 
certain functions – such as environmental ma-
nagement – to local government units which in-
clude provincial, municipal and barangay6 («vil-
lage») levels of governance.
One of the local governments that has demons-
trated early unreceptiveness towards mining is 
the provincial government of Capiz that im-
posed in 1999 a 15-year moratorium on all large-
scale mining (Capiz Provincial Ordinance No. 
6, 1999). Similarly, the Oriental Mindoro pro-
vincial government declared in 2002 a 25-year 
freeze on ‘large-scale mining or extraction in all 
forms’ (Oriental Mindoro Provincial Ordinance 
No. 01-2002, 2002). he following provinces 
also have legislations disallowing large-scale mi-
ning operations within their jurisdictions: 
- Albay (ordinance took efect in March 2011), 
- Bukidnon (ordinance took efect in May 
2011, buttressing a related legislation passed in 
2009), 
- Occidental Mindoro (ordinance took efect in 
2009), 
- and Zamboanga del Norte banning specii-
cally open pit mining (ordinance took efect on 
November 2011).
he most controversial opposition to mining 
by local governments, supported by their consti-
tuent citizens, have been waged in Palawan 
(misn, 2010), Romblon, and South Cotabato 
(Minda News, 2011a, 2011b) because the local 
«It shall be the policy of the Government to pro-
mote responsible mineral resources operation, 
development and utilization, in order to enhance 
economic growth, in a manner that adheres to the 
principles of sustainable development and with due 
regard for justice and equity, sensitivity to the culture 
of the Filipino people and respect for the Philippine 
sovereignty.»
Executive Order 270 is impressively benevolent 
and democratic in its rationale and intent, and is 
also extensive in its coverage. Furthermore, it de-
clares as its guiding policy the following (2004, 
emphasis supplied):
«Government recognizes the critical role of invest-
ments in the minerals industry for national develop-
ment and poverty alleviation and shall provide support 
mechanisms for a sustained mineral exploration pro-
gram, responsive research and development priorities 
and capability building for industry manpower; Clear, 
stable and predictable investment and regulatory 
policies shall be instituted to facilitate investments in 
mining, leading to a prosperous minerals industry; 
Value-adding as a measure of optimizing beneits 
from minerals for the Filipino people shall be pursued 
through the development of downstream industries to 
achieve greater productivity and eiciency.»
Represented mainly by the Oice of the Pre-
sident, the mgb, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the National Economic Development 
Authority and other agencies, the national go-
vernment regards mining as a critical means to 
pave the country’s path to industrialization by 
generating wealth, employment and other bene-
its in both rural and urban regions (Defensor, 
2005). he national government acknowledges 
its need for strong partnership with the minerals 
industry. hus, true enough, both key govern-
ment agencies and the comp have bonded them-
selves into a solid and busy team in marketing 
to foreign investors the Philippines as an invest-
ment destination. 
In early 2005, representatives of the national 
government and top oicers of the comp had 
engaged in what they termed as ‘mining roads-
hows’ in various parts of the world including 
China, Singapore, South Africa, Canada and 
Australia4. hese roadshows consisted of mee-
tings and discussions with foreign investors on 
mining investment opportunities in the Phi-
lippines. Subsequently in 2006, the comp or-
ganized an international investment mining 
conference in the Philippines attended by re-
4.  he «mining roadshows» in Australia were held in three cities namely Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. he author 
attended the one held in Melbourne on 10 August 2005.
5.  he 24 priority mining projects include potential medium- to large-scale mining ventures many of which need 
capital which local mining companies lack.
6.  he barangay is the smallest and most basic administrative political unit in the Philippines. A group of barangay 
makes up a municipality. A cluster of municipalities constitutes a province. In 2011, there are 42,027 barangays in the 
entire Philippines (dilg, 2011).
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lion to us as part of our share in the excise taxes paid 
by mining companies. We are not supposed to beg 
the national government but we are compelled to, 
lest we will never get the money that belongs to us.» 
(Interview on November 2004, Poblacion, Itogon, 
Benguet)
he misgivings of local government oicials to-
wards the national government about revenues 
from mining are also expressed in the views of a 
prominent member of the League of Provinces 
of the Philippines (lpp)7. During the 9th Gene-
ral Assembly of the lpp in 2012, Governor Joey 
Sarte Salceda described the mgb as needing to 
heed to the «doctrine of local preference and 
the philosophy of subsidiarity» in administering 
mining projects (Bicol Mail, 2012). his implies 
that provincial, municipal, and barangay levels 
of government must be the bodies to grant ap-
provals for mining projects. Salceda also noted 
that at the same time, mining companies must 
pay taxes direct to the provincial and municipal 
governments. Salceda is the governor of Albay, 
the location of Rapu-rapu mine which became 
the irst large-scale mining project that opened 
in the Philippines – and eventually advanced to 
production stage – after almost three decades 
during which no new mine in the country com-
menced operation. 
he criticism against revenues from mining is 
not only about long delays experienced by local 
governments in receiving their allocated share. 
More important is the ratio of local government 
allocation relative to how much is ultimately ta-
ken by the mining companies. Salceda is a major 
critic of what he considers an austerely «Lilipu-
tian» share of local governments from mining. 
In 2010, mining companies in the Bicol Region8 
posted PhP9.2 billion9-worth production du-
ring the irst half of the year. According to Sal-
ceda, the mammoth amount was for the mining 
companies, not for the people in the region. He 
added that mining companies paid PhP647 mil-
lion10 in taxes to the national treasury and re-
mitted a meager share of only PhP90 million11 
to local governments (Southern Luzon Business 
Review, 2011).
he concerns of local governments are not li-
mited to the perceived miserly revenues from 
mining. he reasons for local governments’ hin-
dering the entry of mining projects, or restrict-
ing certain methods (e.g., open pit) of mining 
laws are being challenged by mining companies 
and the mgb-denr, both arguing that national 
government laws have primacy over local go-
vernment laws. However, in August 2013, the 
denr Secretary conceded not to challenge South 
Cotabato’s ban on open-pit mining (Business 
Mirror, 2013b). Meanwhile, the governor of 
Romblon has reairmed his resolve to challenge 
the resolution issued by a Regional Trial Court 
that rendered Romblon’s provincial ordinance, 
placing a moratorium on mining, as unconstitu-
tional (Business Mirror, 2013a). While disputa-
tions have been continuing until the present, the 
initiatives of some provinces in legislating ordi-
nances to restrict mining operations, are likely to 
trigger other provinces to follow suit.
Under the Mining Act and its implementing 
rules and regulations, local governments are en-
visaged to realize wealth creation from mineral 
resources to drive growth and provide livelihood 
and income opportunities for their constituen-
cies. In particular, the Mining Act provides that 
local governments are entitled to a 40% share 
from the gross collection of the national govern-
ment from mining taxes, royalties and other 
fees. In addition, occupation fees entitle the pro-
vince to 30%, and host municipalities to 70%. 
hese provisions are strengthened by the Local 
Government Code. Section 292 stipulates that 
if a natural resource is located in the province, 
then the provincial government will have a share 
of 20%; municipality, 45%; and the barangay, 
35% out of the 40% revenue that the national 
government remits to the local government.
hese all seem auspicious. However, local go-
vernments receive their share of tax revenues at 
a much delayed time. he yearly taxes collected 
from mining operations accrue to the national 
treasury and it would take at least a couple of 
years for a local government to collect its fund 
allocation. he insight of a mayor of a mining 
municipality ofers a picture of the situation.
«Our hometown as you know very well is a place of 
mining. But take a look around and tell me, have we 
progressed signiicantly through the 80-decade-long 
operation of that company? he company has been 
paying its taxes to the national government every 
year. We had to wait like beggars for decades before 
we receive our internal revenue allotment from the 
national government. As for our latest allotment, it 
is debasing that we have been prodding the national 
government since 2000 to remit about PhP87 mil-
7.  he League of Provinces is a formal organization whose creation is mandated by the Local Government Code. Its 
objectives, among others, include: to foster unity and cooperation among all provinces of the country, and to serve as a 
forum of discussion and feedback mechanism on policies afecting local governments.
8.  Albay and ive other provinces (Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate and Sorsogon) comprise 
the Bicol Region. Each of the provinces has mining operations.
9.  PhP9.2 billion equates to roughly US$206 million (PhP0.0224 = US$1).
10.  PhP647 million is about US$14.5 million.
11.  PhP90 million is approximately over US$2 million.
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as farmers, ishermen, and in several cases, indi-
genous peoples. In general, local ordinances be-
come the formal shields of communities against 
the probable entry of mining projects into their 
towns or villages. In the same manner, local of-
icials make public declarations that the legis-
lations they enacted are based on consultations 
with their constituencies. hus far, this is the 
case, broadly, of South Cotabato and Romblon. 
Unfortunately in other places (e.g., Cantilan 
in Surigao del Sur, Didipio in Nueva Vizcaya), 
communities are divided in which members are 
lamentably categorized as either «pro-mining» or 
«anti-mining».
Civil Society
When it comes to dealing with the actions of 
the combined strength of the state and the mine-
rals industry, some local governments and com-
munities who are not convinced about the wis-
dom of opening their doors to mining, look for 
support. At both the national and village levels, 
some help is often found in the Roman Catholic 
Church. Catholic clergymen, particularly mem-
bers of the politically inluential Catholic Bis-
hops Conference of the Philippines (cbcp), raise 
an ethical issue pertinent to mining: the land 
must not be «deiled», the environment protec-
ted and the disadvantaged sectors particularly 
the indigenous peoples must not be displaced.
he clergymen are supported by the advocacy 
activities carried out by nationalist groups that 
tend to be ideological in orientation and whose 
rhetoric appeals to citizens and communities 
desperate for support. heir discourse includes 
claims to stop the entry of transnational mining 
companies into the Philippines, and views that 
foreign mining companies are «imperialist plun-
derers». Many nationalist organizations are ei-
ther directly allied with or sympathetic to bayan 
(Bagong Alyansa Makabayan)12, a leftist supra-
organization that coordinates mass movements. 
bayan takes a political position during elections 
and represents peasants, industrial workers, wo-
men, public transport drivers, teachers, indige-
nous peoples, and others. bayan organizations 
are overtly revolutionary and seek involvement 
in any constituency of resistance that they can 
identify.
In many ways, non-government organizations 
(ngos) and peoples’ organizations (pos) derive 
their reason for being, as well as the legitimacy 
and stability of their avowed causes from com-
munities. One of these ngos is the Alyansa Tigil 
Mina13 (atm) which plays a signiicant role in 
within their jurisdiction, include the perceived 
need to protect, conserve and rehabilitate the 
environment; judiciously and equitably use na-
tural resources; and consult with community 
members (Business Mirror, 2013a; Cleanbiz Asia, 
2013; Philstar, 2013; South Cotabato Provincial 
Ordinance No. 04, 2010). he foreseen reper-
cussions of mining operations on the environ-
ment, are expressed in the explanation of a ba-
rangay chairman why he and his community are 
opposed to mining:
«We do not want mining here in our barangay. Our 
water sources are being destroyed. We are alarmed. 
Any mining operation is a major disruption in na-
ture’s processes. his means mining brings a serious 
threat to our water sources, and an invitation to 
landslides and lashloods. It is us, the people in the 
barangay, that will sufer the harmful consequences of 
mining. It is not those at the mgb and the executives 
of mining companies much less the foreigners that 
own the companies. hey do not feel what we feel be-
cause they are not of this place. hey do not unders-
tand our situation, and they cannot sympathize with 
us. hey come here and stay only as visitors. he mgb 
and mining companies insist that digging our mine-
rals is what needs to be done. hat is their own idea, 
not ours. hey do not live our lives that is why they 
see our coconut farms as dispensable. But this is our 
place; we have no other.» (Interview on 30 December 
2013, Labo, Camarines Norte)
he above insight underscores the attribute 
of rootedness in a place – the locale. It suggests 
ideas of concord and ainity with the locality. 
According to local government oicials, an un-
derstanding of local situations is a trait which is 
manifestly lacking among representatives of the 
national government and the minerals industry. 
he above remark also draws attention to the no-
tions of domain and locality, which are absent 
in the discourse of national government oicials. 
he claim to locality and attachment to place 
reechoes the viewpoint of Arthur Pingoy, the 
governor of South Cotabato Province whose en-
vironment code bans open pit mining. In a press 
release where he was asked about his reaction to 
Executive Order 79, the governor stated :
«Our ordinance stays unless its validity is challenged 
in court…We in the local government are in the best 
position to know what is good for our people and the 
environment. I will continue to implement the law 
(anti-open pit ordinance) unless it is declared by the 
court illegal.» (2004: 24) 
he concerns of local governments essentially 
incorporate the views and aspirations of local 
communities that include speciic sectors such 
12.  Bagong Alyansa Makabayan means «he New Patriotic Alliance». For related information, see http://www.philip-
pinerevolution.net.
13.  Alyansa Tigil Mina stands for «Alliance Against Mining». More information is available at http://alyansatigilmina.net/.
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ted and ishing which was a major livelihood for 
more than 20,000 families in 42 communities 
stopped due to the low of mine tailings burying 
the channels and the valley loor (sepo, 2005)14. 
he tailings spillage drew calls from mainly the 
country’s Catholic clergy, church-based organi-
zations, civic-oriented groups, and conservation 
and environment activists for opposition to mi-
ning in general and the outright scrapping of the 
Mining Act in particular.
Mining Act petitioned as unconstitutional
Partly as an apprehensive response to «more 
Marcoppers in waiting», and as a circumspect 
reaction towards the entry of foreign mining 
companies to the country, a group of ngos iled 
on 10 January 1997 a petition at the Philippine 
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionali-
ty of the Mining Act and its implementing rules 
and regulations. he group of ngos was led by 
the Legal Rights Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan 
(lrc-KsK). Known as the La Bugal-B’laan Case, 
the petition called for the Supreme Court to nul-
lify the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and the 
ftaa entered into in 1995 by and between the 
Philippine Government and Tampakan Mine-
ral Resources Corporation, Inc. his company 
was owned by the Australian Western Mining 
Corporation (wmc)15. Although wmc is the only 
formal private respondent in the case, the entire 
minerals industry had actually been handed the 
legal challenge.
he key issue of the appeal pertains to the 
unconstitutionality of the ftaa provision of 
the Mining Act because, as claimed by the pe-
titioners, such provision allows 100% foreign 
ownership in large-scale exploration, develop-
ment, utilization and exploitation of mineral 
resources in the Philippines by iling ftaas. 
Such practice, the petitioners argued, violates 
the constitutional provision that the natural re-
sources of the Philippines are a national heritage 
which foreign companies, through ftaas, should 
not exploit.
From the time the La Bugal-B’laan case was 
iled in 1997, the Supreme Court had not issued 
a decision. In January 2004, after seven years 
of deliberations, the Supreme Court decided 
that the provision of the Mining Act allowing 
foreign-owned corporations to operate and ma-
nage mining activities in the country contravenes 
the Constitution on the grounds that it was in 
the nature of a «service contract» (Panganiban, 
providing the channel through which communi-
ties have been able to articulate their apprehen-
sions towards mining projects. atm is an alliance 
of large and small organizations with the com-
mon cause of confronting «the oicial line of 
thinking about mining». he atm (2014) is:
«[…] a coalition of organizations and groups who 
have decided to collectively challenge the aggressive 
promotion of large-scale mining in the Philippines. 
Composed of Non-Government Organizations, 
People’s Organizations, Church groups and academic 
institutions, the atm is both an advocacy group and 
a people’s movement, working in solidarity to protect 
Filipino communities and natural resources that are 
threatened by large-scale mining operations.»
As an association of pro-environment activist 
organizations, and advocates against large-scale 
mining, the organization is calling for, among 
others, the scrapping of the Mining Act of 1995 
and the passage of an Alternative People’s Mining 
Act. atm claims that it is not against mining. 
Rather, it «is against the policy regime in pro-
moting foreign-controlled and export-oriented 
large-scale mining» (Alyansa Tigil Mina, 2014).
Implementing the Mining Act: an arena of social 
imaginaries 
he Mining Act was passed in March 1995. 
As described earlier in this paper, the year wit-
nessed the scores of mining companies iling ap-
plications for exploration and mining projects in 
the Philippines. Barely a year after however, the 
ecstatic momentum within the national govern-
ment and the minerals industry dissipated. his 
was due to a combination of historical, political 
and economic factors. he process of implemen-
ting the Mining Act has demonstrated the clash 
of social imaginaries.
he disaster that stimulated mass opposition to 
the Mining Act
On 24 March 1996, a major tailings spillage 
occurred at the Marcopper mine in Marinduque 
Island. An estimated 1.5 to 3 million cubic me-
ters of mine tailings lowed into the Makulapnit 
River, Boac River, and ultimately the ocean at 
the Westside of the island (Plumlee, Morton, 
Boyle, Medlin and Centeno, 2000). It was a 
catastrophe of unprecedented proportions in 
the Philippines: agricultural ields were inunda-
14.  Inquests on the accident established that the mines’ pollution problems had been occurring for many years. Previous 
penalties were imposed on the company for its marine disposal of over 200 million metric tons of tailings in Calancan Bay 
resulting in marine pollution and siltation of about 0.84 km2 during 1975 to 1986 (Ramos, Cabalda and Banaag, 2000). 
However, permanent closure was never enforced.
15.  In 2004, Western Mining Corporation (Australia) sold the project to the joint venture of Sagittarius Mining, Indo-
phil Resources, Xstrata Holdings and J.P. Morgan.
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and Atty Cesar Europa challenged at the Su-
preme Court the constitutionality of the ipra. 
he petition is perceived by observers as a coun-
termove to the La Bugal-B’laan case. he issues 
in the petition pertain mainly to the ownership 
of minerals, property rights, priority rights and 
self-delineation by the iccs/ips. he petitioners 
also questioned the powers and jurisdictions of 
the ncip and the applicability of customary law 
to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral 
domains and ancestral lands as violating due 
process of law.
With the legal challenge confronting the ipra, 
the government withheld the release of the ncip’s 
budget in September 1998. hus, the ncip was 
precluded from performing its functions. Indi-
genous and other concerned sectors were asking 
why the government did not also suspend the 
implementation of the Mining Act, which was 
similarly facing a legal challenge before the Su-
preme Court. On 6 December 2000, the Su-
preme Court dismissed the petition against the 
constitutionality of the ipra (see Supreme Court 
of the Philippines, 2000). Subsequently, the 
petitioners iled a motion for reconsideration. 
However on 21 September 2001, the Supreme 
Court resolved and declared that the ipra is 
constitutional.  
Reversal of earlier ruling on the Mining Act
As earlier noted in this paper, the Supreme Court 
ruled in January 2004 against the Mining Act. 
Expectedly, the High Court’s decision caused a 
stir within the Oice of President Macapagal-Ar-
royo, the denr, and the mining industry. hus, 
the mgb enjoined by the private respondents and 
the minerals industry represented by the comp 
immediately appealed the High Tribunal’s deci-
sion. hey argued, among others, that the Philip-
pine Constitution allowed foreign contractors to 
have reasonable management over mining pro-
jects and the Mining Act ensured a fair and equi-
table sharing of the proceeds of mining projects 
between the contractor and the state. 
he appellants also asserted that annulling the 
ftaa provisions would deprive the country bil-
lions of dollars of potential investments from 
outside. he President of the comp argued that 
the Philippines has already lost at least $20 
billion-worth of export revenues because the 
Mining Act was not fully implemented since 
its passage in 1995 (Clancy, 2005). he comp 
worked closely with the Oice of the Solicitor 
General and then iled a motion for reconside-
ration to the Supreme Court to plead for an oral 
2005). he Supreme Court ruled in favour of 
the petitioners, thereby nullifying the Mining 
Act’s ftaa provisions that allowed the execution 
of service contracts with foreign irms for explo-
ration and mining ventures. he Supreme Court 
also declared null and void the ftaa entered into 
by and between the Philippine Government and 
wmc.
Enactment of a law to protect indigenous 
peoples rights
While the Mining Act was wedged in a legal 
challenge, a policy to protect indigenous re-
source rights was enacted by the Congress of 
the Philippines: Republic Act 8371, otherwise 
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act 
(ipra). Its inal passage16 on 29 October 1997 
was the result of a decade of lobbying, delibe-
rations and consultations by concerned ngos, 
peoples’ organizations and indigenous peoples’ 
representatives with the support of public inte-
rest lawyers who are themselves environmental 
activists.
he ipra is a realization of the State policy on 
rights of indigenous peoples and cultural com-
munities as declared in Section 22, Article II of 
the Philippine Constitution. he ipra provides 
for formulating procedures to set right the his-
torical injustices sufered by indigenous cultural 
communities/indigenous peoples (iccs/ips). In 
this way, the ipra exalts the state «by its belated 
but profoundly signiicant acknowledgment that 
some laws are not rooted in the colonial past, 
but originate and endure in our indigenous heri-
tage» (Leonen, 2004: 154), 
he ipra created the National Commission 
on Indigenous Peoples (ncip) as «the primary 
government agency for the formulation of and 
implementation of policies, plans and programs 
to promote and protect the rights and well-being 
of iccs/ips and their ancestral domains as well as 
their rights thereto» (RA 8371, 1997). he ipra 
gives explicit recognition to and protection of the 
rights of iccs/ips «to their ancestral domains to 
ensure their economic, social and cultural well-
being». he ancestral domain of iccs/ips not 
only covers the physical land they occupy but 
the totality of resources and environment inclu-
ding mineral and natural resources underneath. 
he ipra provides for priority rights to iccs/ips 
in the extraction, development or exploitation 
of any natural resources within their ancestral 
domain (ncip Administrative Order 3, 2002).
A year after ipra was enacted, two lawyers, i.e., 
Isagani Cruz (a retired Supreme Court Justice) 
16.  he law’s passage had a considerably lengthy history in which one change built incrementally upon another. Cir-
cumstances leading to the enactment of the law can be traced to as early as 1974.
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Act and its implementing rules and regulations 
provide for mechanisms to ensure community 
consultation, local government empowerment, 
respect and concern for the indigenous cultural 
communities, and equitable sharing of beneits 
of natural wealth. However, the national govern-
ment has not paid attention to actualizing, in 
full, these principles. his was due to the mgb 
and other government agencies having been fo-
cused on the external dimension of the state’s re-
source nationalist posturing – the government’s 
relationship with foreign investors. he national 
government, in close partnership with the mine-
rals industry, has devoted so much resources to 
the prospects of generating foreign investments 
but serious issues of equity and allocating bene-
its from mining have remained unresolved in 
the local communities. 
his article demonstrates that local-level deci-
sion-making – enshrined in the Local Govern-
ment Code – brings in the participation of 
communities in matters of resource governance. 
he involvement of communities legitimizes the 
legislative actions of local governments. Local 
governments formulated relevant ordinances 
that have restricted or completely blocked the 
entry of large-scale mining or speciic methods 
such as open pit mining in the provinces. he 
legislations, which incorporate the concerns of 
communities whose lifeways are threatened by 
foreseen adverse impact of mining, have created 
the eiciency and efectiveness in local resistance 
against the actions of the national government 
and mining companies. his resistance becomes 
long-run because the confrontation between na-
tional government and local government is about 
legislations that clinch the claims of the latter 
and repudiates the actions of the former. In other 
words, the confrontation concerns the rule of law 
and the autonomy of local governments. 
Local governments have served as efective 
corporate bodies for not only articulating the 
concerns and interests of constituent communi-
ties vis-a-vis the distant national government but 
also securing the legal bases of long-term resis-
tance. he unwelcoming initiatives of local go-
vernments towards foreign mining projects aim 
to conserve mineral resources and prevent fore-
seen environmental problems that are associated 
with mining operations. he organizing initia-
tives of other actors such as civil society groups 
are critical in creating venues where views and 
activities of local populations and community 
leaders are considered, coordinated, and forma-
lized both in the formulation of ordinances as 
well as in ensuring their implementation. he 
actions of lower-level political-administrative 
units manifest sub-national resource nationalism 
that is founded on locality and ainity to home-
land, and confronts the national government in 
matters of resource governance.
hearing of the case in order to explain better the 
implications of the decision. hus, an exhaustive 
constitutional review and the oral hearing in the 
Supreme Court were held in July 2004. 
In December of the same year, the Supreme 
Court reversed its January 2004 decision: it de-
clared the Mining Act of 1995 as constitutional. 
he High Court ruled that the mining laws that 
were questioned earlier – the implementing rules 
and regulations (irr) crafted by denr, and the 
ftaa with wmc-Philippines which was execu-
ted in 1995 – do not breach the constitution. It 
airmed the legality of the ftaa. In other words, 
there was nothing unconstitutional about the 
mining law’s implementing rules and regula-
tions, and foreign ownership of large-scale mi-
ning operations is legal.
Conclusion
his paper looked into the Mining Act of 1995 
and the extent to which this law accommodates 
or responds to the aspirations of constituencies 
such as local governments, which are assumed 
to represent the aspirations and concerns of local 
communities.
Under the Mining Act, the exploitation, deve-
lopment and utilization of the country’s mineral 
resources involve two major actors: the state that 
owns the resources, represented by the national 
government; and the mining companies bringing 
in the much needed foreign capital. However, a 
mining project is not complete with the settling of 
the terms and conditions of the contract between 
these two parties. A mining project involves the 
default participation of other important players 
that include the following: a) members of com-
munities whose aspirations and notions of «good 
life» or «development» have been shaped by their 
relationship to their homeland and the resources 
that support it; b) local government oicials who 
assume to represent the interests of their consti-
tuent communities; and c) civil society groups 
whose goals include directly challenging the neo-
liberal policies of the state.
Resource nationalism is a position that sup-
ports the goal of a state to generate revenues. 
However, this is not true if the particular form 
of resource nationalism that the state espouses 
is not shared or concurred by the larger num-
ber of its citizens. he case of the Philippines 
demonstrates the deicient legitimacy of the 
state – before its citizens at the local level – in 
mineral resources governance. he anomaly lies 
in the over centralized approach of the national 
government in decisions and actions pertinent 
to the exploitation, development and utilization 
of the country’s mineral wealth. he Mining 
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